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Who Cried for Argentina? 
Notes on the 2001-02 Crisis
Andrés Lazzarini
In the implementation of the recipes prepared by the Washington Consen-sus (WC) in the early 1990s, Argentina 
was much admired by the metropolis as 
an example of a successful developing 
country on the periphery that had chosen 
to take the turnpike of market-friendly 
policies rather than the old cobblestone 
road of pro-industrialist strategies and 
state intervention.
The allegiance with free-market tenets 
and globalisation was so completely met 
by Argentina that at the 1998 annual 
meeting of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), held in the wake of the Russian 
crisis, the then Argentine President Carlos 
Menem was invited to address the gather-
ing (an accord u sually reserved only for US 
presidents). Menem remarked: 
We must wipe out the last vestiges of protec-
tionism and production subsides (…) This 
is the time for all to defend the principles of 
globalisation (…) We are convinced that in 
order to address the serious problems facing 
the world, the Argentinian program, adapted 
to the special circumstances of each nation, is 
the path that leads us out of the current cri-
sis (6 October 1998, presidential address at 
the 53rd IMF annual meeting of the board of 
governors; Summary Proceedings, pp 11-12).
In that address Menem craftily hid the 
high social costs implied in “the Argentini-
an programme”. That programme, which 
was completely based on financial capital 
flows, took a heavy toll on many, but none 
both inside and outside the country at that 
time warned Argentina of the perils of 
t ying the economy to the “currency board”. 
Ten years of the peg of the Argentine peso 
(the national currency) to the US dollar at 
the rate of 1:1, coupled with the “com-
mandments” of the Washington C onsensus, 
led Argentina to its worst e conomic and 
political crisis ever experienced by the peo-
ple of the country. Almost a decade has 
since then elapsed, and m aybe it is a good 
occasion, in the light of the current down-
turn, to revisit the main events of one of 
the deepest crisis in a d eveloping country.
1 Background
On 27 March 1991, the Argentine govern-
ment enacted a law establishing an exchange 
rate fixed by the peg of the national peso to 
the US dollar at a 1:1 rate. The experiences 
of the previous years with h yperinflation (a 
monthly price inflation touching 96% over 
the second quarter of 1989), had convinced 
the new administration (Menem took office 
in advance in July 1989) that only a fixed 
exchange rate could stabilise the economy. 
The first important implication of the cur-
rency board arrangement was the surrender 
of the role of the central bank as a last- 
resort lender – the ability of monetary policy 
to vary money supply base was now tied to 
the entry of US dollars. But this policy also 
implied, a lthough more subtly, a total poli-
cy conditionality. In fact, to restore credibil-
ity and confidence in the system the gov-
ernment complemented the exchange rate 
policy with market-friendly economic poli-
cies d irectly derived from the Washington 
Con sensus – opening up of trade and 
fi nancial flows (elimination of import barri-
ers and capital controls), structural reforms 
(privatisation of public services, reform of 
the state), privatisation of the pension sys-
tem, fiscal austerity (budget cuts) and total 
d eregulation of the economy. 
The whole architecture was tied to a per-
manent currency inflow. The privatisation 
of public utilities (the national oil company, 
natural gas, railways, electri city, telecom-
munications, the national commercial air-
line, water supply, postal services, and gov-
ernment banks), which was carried out 
steadily from 1991 o nwards, was paramount 
in that regard, as almost every public serv-
ice was sold to foreign capital – mostly un-
der very weak regulatory conditions – and 
the tariffs of the services were dollarised. 
Behind the propaganda of private efficiency 
over p ublic action, the fact that there was a 
low e xchange rate benefited these foreign 
p rivately-owned companies because the 
proceeds in pesos from their main a ctivities 
(mostly services devoted to the domestic 
market) could be exchanged “cheaply” for 
dollars and then repatriated. 
The initial “good” results enthused 
many. Financial liberalisation permitted 
sizeable capital inflows ($71.9 billion dur-
ing 1992-2000),1 which certainly helped to 
back up the peg. The inflation rate fell from 
84% in 1991 to 17.5% in 1992, meanwhile 
In the midst of the current global 
slowdown it is worth revisiting 
Argentina’s dismal experience 
in the 1990s with a complete 
embrace of globalisation, 
the crisis of 2001-02 and its 
subsequent recovery.
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the gross domestic product (GDP) rose 
steadily between 1991 and 1995 at high 
rates (e g, 10.6% in 1991). The overvalued 
exchange rate implied not only a lag in 
exports (Argentina’s exports priced in US 
dollars turned out to be not very competi-
tive) but also a marked spurt in imports, 
which eventually led to a de industriali-
sation of the economy. More over, credit 
expanded. The drop in inflation implied a 
monetisation of the eco nomy, which allowed 
for a rise in consumption, parti cularly of 
imported items (conspicuous consump-
tion, mostly hi-tech goods). Low inflation 
rates, GDP growth,2 credit expansion, bi-
monetarisation of the economy, a rise in 
consumption, and capital inflows paved 
the way for the idea that the turnpike to the 
“first world”, as president Menem liked to 
put it, was within the country’s reach. This 
idea became popular with the Argentina of 
the 1990s thanks to the rise of neoliberal 
ideas which ended up being predominant 
in Latin America (Palma 2008).
2 Current Account Deficit 
Reliance on financial capital inflows made 
the economy much more sensitive to the 
repercussions of the 1990s international 
financial crises (e g, the 1995 Mexican c risis 
with the consequent “Tequila” e ffect) which 
eventually undermined the basis of this 
architecture. The current a ccount ultimately 
turned into a large deficit. This deficit 
amounted to $85 billion for 1992-2000. It 
is worth noting that whereas in 1994 were 
equivalent to interest payments and profit 
remittances, one-third of that deficit, in 1999 
they were equivalent to half the deficit. 
Profit remittances for 1992-2000 ($72.9 
billion) more than offset the currency in-
flows. This unsustainable situation gave rise 
to an external imbalance in the economy 
(O’Connell 2002). With inadequate exports 
after 1995 in the context of international fi-
nancial turmoil, (recall the 1997 Asian cri-
sis), the way out to maintain the currency 
board was to increase foreign debt. 
Moreover, once almost all the state-
owned public utilities had been sold, there 
was no possibility of obtaining the neces-
sary currency to back the plan – hence the 
persistent indebtedness on the part of the 
government, and both local and foreign 
privately-owned banks hit the jackpot by 
lending the currency needed to overcome 
the deficit. Consequently, the interest pay-
ments on public debt became large – by 
2001 it accounted for 20% of public reve-
nues, thus giving rise to a persistent public 
deficit since the state’s revenues shrank as a 
by-product of the recession that set in dur-
ing 1998 (Ocampo 2003). Yet, the refinanc-
ing programmes and borrowing from the 
IMF and World Bank demanded the public 
sector make further budget cuts, and often 
imposed on the country more stringent 
conditions on capital requirements than 
those recommended by Basel standards. 
Thus, it is significant that the total foreign 
debt which was $62.2 billion in 1992 grew 
to $ 147 billion in 2000. The official policy 
was to sustain the peg at whatever cost.
3 Social Consequences
Free-market policies, hard money and per-
sistent foreign indebtedness disrupted the 
social tissue of Argentina. Deindustrialisa-
tion brought about by the high incentives 
to import, the structural reforms in the 
government sphere (which, besides the 
privatisations, involved reducing its size in 
the economy) and stagnation gave rise to an 
unemployment rate of 21% in 2001. From 
July 1998 onwards, a 45-month long reces-
sion hit the economy; the public a ccounts 
were damaged, and the recipe continued 
to be budget cuts. The neo- liberal motto 
that market forces alone would have bal-
anced “excessive state intrusion” had not 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR AN NGO
OUTREACH, a leading NGO operating in South India with Head Quarters at 
Bangalore, is looking for a suitable person for the post of Executive Director. 
OUTREACH is currently engaged in Rural Development (Natural Resource 
Management, Community Organisation, Rural Livelihoods, Micro-finance, Training 
& Consultancy Services) in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. 
 
*  The candidate (about 50-55 years of age) should have an experience of about 
15-20 years at senior level, preferably in the NGO sector. 
* His/Her responsibilities will include overall management of the NGO, leading 
a team of development professionals, preparing project proposals, mobilizing 
resources for the organization from donors, corporate sector and Government 
and Public sectors, maintaining proper liaison with various associated 
institutions. 
* Must have good communication skills both oral and in writing. 
* Terms and conditions of employment are negotiable and will be commensurate 
with his/her skills and experience. 
 
Interested candidates may apply within 15 days to 
The Executive Director
OUTREACH
No.109, Coles Road, Frazer Town, Bangalore 560 005 
or by email to: ed.outreachindia@gmail.com
worked. Together with unemployment, 
poverty soared, reaching an incredible 
50% of the population by 2001-02. 
The last days of the currency board were 
characterised by a dramatic development. 
The “snowballing” of foreign debt to sus-
tain the peg had inflated itself. During 
2001, capital started fleeing the economy, 
hastily in the last months. Capital flight 
during the crisis had an impact on the pop-
ulation. On 1 December 2001 the national 
government decreed a (partial) bank de-
posit freeze. That measure not only cov-
ered bank deposits nominated both in pe-
sos and US dollars, but also the bank ac-
counts of the wages of employees and 
workers. It only allowed a withdrawal of a 
maximum of 250 pesos, then equal to $250. 
Most of the population’s savings and wage 
accounts were, literally, locked in the so-
called corralito (farmyard). Not surprising-
ly, this policy was pursued to ensure the 
continuity of the banking system and to 
honour the foreign debt at the expense of 
the majority of the population. So usurious 
lending to the public sector was comple-
mented by safe capital flight, guaranteed 
by the government’s measures, which, both 
the IMF and the World Bank applauded in the 
name of safeguarding the currency board.
The decisions taken between the last 
days of president Fernando De la Rúa 
(19 and 20 December 2001), until former 
senator Eduardo Duhalde was sworn in as 
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executive chief (January 2002), i e, during 
the period when three different presidents 
were appointed, were ineffective to over-
come the crash. That is why in early January 
2002 the national currency was devalued, 
exchange controls were set up and both 
banks’ credits and deposits were “pesified” 
at the rate 1:1. Argentina, as in 1998 but for 
very different reasons, once again drew the 
attention of the inter national financial 
institutions – default on public debt was 
declared after the social protests of Decem-
ber 2001, and a series of renegotiations with 
the IMF and other creditors had to be set up.
4 Crisis and People’s Resistance 
The crisis affected the majority of the pop-
ulation, not only its poorest layers but also 
middle class and even some upper middle 
class households. Widespread discontent 
boiled over. Although one of the most evi-
dent manifestations of the crash was the 
protest of deposit holders, which gave rise to 
a movement of “savers” who organised 
themselves to get back their deposits in US 
dollars, the crisis hit mostly the l ower 
s trata. Upon devaluation the latter groups 
had to bear the burden of inflation of 
p rices of basic goods. Certainly, unemploy-
ment (23% by 2002) led the country to 
widespread poverty. Half the population 
(total population being 38 million) fell be-
low the poverty line and an extensive 25% 
which was not able to afford a basic food 
basket fell below the indigence threshold. 
The year 2002 will be remembered as one 
of the most dreadful years in Argentina’s 
history, the GDP fell by 11%.
The strategies undertaken to cope with 
the crisis depended to a great extent on 
the mechanisms that the social groups 
concerned could identify as their best 
available means. There was a huge and 
broad social movement, mostly encom-
passing the unemployed people – the so-
called “picketers”. This group, which pro-
tested against the neoliberal reforms and 
stood up for state and social aid, together 
with former workers who took over the 
firms that had shut down, constituted the 
basis of the protests after the crash. 
But employment and poverty problems 
were also experienced by the middle class. 
This heterogeneous social group followed 
a broad range of occupations (skilled 
workers, farmers with small/medium 
sized land, services employees, etc) and 
had jobs with a certain status (bank clerks, 
teachers, etc). Many, if not most, of these 
social layers experienced unemployment, 
underemployment, and the distress of the 
downturn. In the Argentina of the 1990s it 
was not difficult to meet with graduates 
driving taxis. Quite likely, significant 
pockets of middle class members partici-
pated in social protests. This group was 
named the “banging pots”, because they 
reacted by banging their cooking pots 
against the national curfew decreed on 
the evening of 19 December 2001. Out of 
this outburst many organisations were 
born, most of them without any actual 
e xperience/working in, with political par-
ties and the like. The “banging pots” and 
the picketers fused under the banner of 
anti-neoliberalism and threw themselves 
on to the streets. It was this political event, 
this social union that not only forced the 
government to lift the curfew, but also 
swept the whole cabinet out of power, the 
president included. The government’s 
agenda was now filled with social 
d emands rather than with endless require-
ments of finance as before.
5 Halfway between Direct and 
Indirect Democracy 
Formal representative democracy had to 
bend to listen to the grass root movements’ 
demands. The relationship in Argentina 
between the grass root movements and 
representative democracy has long been 
at odds. Let us take a step back, if only 
briefly. In October 2001, a handful of 
months prior to the upheaval, political dis-
content became apparent. In the elections 
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for deputies and senators, more than 50% 
of the population either chose not to go to 
the polls or expressed their rejection by 
voting blank. This pheno menon, regarded as 
the “wrath vote”, expressed the widespread 
discontent towards representative democ-
racy. It anticipated the forthcoming social 
turmoil – to crowd streets, to occupy pub-
lic offices, to protest against the banks (the 
institutions which perhaps best depicted 
modern capitalism), to take over firms, 
and to block commodity transportation by 
picketers. The formal institutions were put 
in jeopardy and so the formal government 
understood it: in June 2002 the executive 
chief Duhalde was forced to anticipate the 
call for national elections, which would 
take place in April 2003 and lead Néstor 
Kirchner to office one month later.
Expectations of the new administration 
grew. The social movement had broken 
down the long-standing bipartisan system, 
and its fight against the neoliberal policies 
was so deep that the new president grasped 
that message. The Kirchner administra-
tion inaugurated a series of democratic 
policies (to send to court former military 
chiefs during the dict atorships); it kept and 
increased social aid and state-introduced 
employment programmes in 2001-02; it re-
nationalised some public utilities; it set up 
a competitive exchange policy; it intro-
duced progressive taxation on primary 
goods exports. Since mid-2003 Argentina 
has been going through a not able process 
of economic growth (around an 8.8% 
average rate of growth for 2003-07; 7.8% 
for the first half of 2008)3 mostly driven by 
primary resource-based goods exports. 
The unemployment rate has fallen to 8-9% 
today. And certainly considerable pockets 
of citizens living b elow the poverty thresh-
old have improved their condition. 
Whilst it is true that a kind of return to 
a normal status quo business took place, it 
is also true that despite many attempts 
neither the IMF nor the World Bank has so 
far succeeded in meddling in the country’s 
affairs. Moreover, a compromise of the 
government is “not to pay debt at the 
e xpense of people’s hunger” was initially 
rejected by the financial world. Later, 
however, a huge accumulation of reserves 
helped by the boom of primary goods 
inter national prices permitted Argentina 
to cancel out its total debt with IMF. 
6 Lessons
In hindsight, one can grasp that although 
the targets of the protests in Argentina were 
often not very clear, the rejection of neo-
liberal policies was the main result. True, 
the social movement lacked the worker 
unions. During the protests and a ssemblies, 
the absence of coordination between the 
most active elements led the movement ulti-
mately to a standstill. But what also needs 
to be admitted is that despite both the het-
erogeneity and the lack of c oordination, 
picketers, together with “the banging 
pots”, obtained in 2002 a job programme 
for the un employed, and their active par-
ticipatory action decidedly called into 
question the institutions. 
The dramatic events in Argentina have 
not only warned developing countries that 
neo-liberal pro-market policies can dazzle 
the majorities with a false light of would-be 
benefits, but only for a while until the harsh 
sunlight of reality breaks out. They also 
showed how representative parliamentary 
democracy without offering real choices 
can become hollow, until a crisis erupts to 
force into the open the real choices. The 
experience has shown that only an effec-
tive participation in the p olitical scenario 
of the most affected can influence the ac-
tual state of affairs and steer it in another 
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direction. So far, neoliberal alternatives 
under a “new garb” have been rejected not 
only in the elections held since then but 
also, and more importantly, by the collec-
tive memory of the people, who have 
learnt how to curb reckless pro-market 
economic guidelines. If this endeavour 
can be maintained, Argentina’s tears will 
not have been in vain.
Notes
1  The economic data used are taken from O’Connell 
(2002) and the Argentine Ministry of Economy 
(www.mecon.gov.ar).
2  The average growth rate for 1987-98, peak to 
peak, was 3.2%, but this is not so high a figure 
i ndeed if compared with the 4.4% average growth 
rate recorded in the 1950s and 1960s, i  e, during 
the “golden age” of Argentine industrialist p olicies 
and state intervention. 
3  According to ECLAC, Argentina will grow by 
around 1.5 % in 2009 during the current down-
turn, whereas, both Mexico and B razil will see a 
contraction of output.
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